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Abstract 
What happens when information reaches the human brain? In economics, a black-box 
approach to information processing in the brain is generally taken with an implicit 
assumption that information, once it reaches the brain, is accurately processed. In sharp 
contrast, research in brain sciences has established that when information reaches the 
brain, a mental template or schema (neural substrate of knowledge) is first activated, which 
influences information absorption. Schemas are created through a resource intensive 
process in which finite brain resources are allocated to different tasks, with resource 
allocation in the brain having an impact on the structure of schemas. In this article, we 
explore the implications of this richer view from brain sciences for the capital asset pricing 
model (CAPM). We show that two versions of CAPM arise depending on how the brain 
resources are allocated in schema creation. In one version, the relationship between beta 
and expected returns is flat along with value and size effects. In the second version, the 
relationship between beta and expected return is strongly positive with an implied risk-free 
rate which could be negative. The two version CAPM provides a unified explanation for a 
series of empirical findings including high-alpha-of-low-beta, size and value effect as well as 
strongly positive relationship between beta and average stock returns at specific times such 
as on macroeconomic announcement days, and at market open. As certain morbidities, such 
as autism, are thought to be associated with lack of schemas that attenuate information, a 
laboratory experiment with high functioning autism sufferers might be our best bet at 
observing the classical CAPM in its full glory.   
 
JEL Classification: G12, G10 
Keywords: CAPM, Value Effect, Size Effect, High-Alpha-Low-Beta, Schema, Resource                                 
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Resource Allocation in the Brain and the Capital Asset Pricing 
Model 
 
What happens when information reaches the human brain? In economics, a black-box 
approach to information absorption is typically taken with an implicit assumption that 
information, when it reaches the brain, is accurately processed. In sharp contrast, research 
in brain sciences has established that when information reaches the brain, a mental 
template or schema, is first activated, which influences information absorption.1 Brain 
imaging studies show that schema formation is a resource-intensive process that involves 
different regions of the brain talking to each other2; however, these schemas, once formed, 
make subsequent processing of schema-consistent information a lot faster by attenuating 
schema-inconsistent information.3   In this article, we study the implications of this richer 
view from brain sciences for the capital asset pricing model (CAPM).  
 A schema can be conceived as a scaffold or a blueprint,4 essentially representing a 
set of preconceived ideas. Neurologically, it is a brain template that involves systems of 
neurons across various brain regions talking to each other, with each system constituting a 
particular unit in the schema. That is, schemas contain units as well as relationships 
between these units. For example, for a car schema, units could be car body and wheel, 
with the relationship that car body contains four wheels. For a firm schema, units could be 
expected cash flow levels and associated risks with a specific relationship between these 
units. Schemas, by only containing the essential details, simplify the world. They direct 
attention to relevant aspects, and speed-up processing of information that fits within the 
schema.  
 When received information does not fit within an existing schema and it can’t be 
ignored, then the brain may create a new schema by attempting to appropriately modify a 
 
1 There is a large body of literature in neuroscience that explores various facets of schemas and how they 
influence information absorption (for a review, see van Kesteren et al (2012), Gilboa and Marlatte (2017), 
Spalding et al (2015) and references therein).  
2 See Ohki and Takei (2018) and references therein.  
3 Sweegers et al (2015) 
4 See Hampson and Morris (1996) or Anderson (2000) for a detailed review of schema theory. 
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related schema.  Brain organizes knowledge in a network of such interconnected schemas. 
For example, a child may initially only have a schema for a horse (large with four legs, hair, 
and a tail). However, when she encounters a cow, a new schema for a cow could be created 
by modifying the horse schema. Similarly, relevant to our context, an investor analysing a 
firm that she has not analysed before, may create a new schema for the firm by altering the 
schema of a similar firm that she has analysed before. Studying the implications of such a 
schema-creation process for CAPM is the subject of this article.  
Research in brain sciences has established that there is brain specialization with 
different brain systems performing different tasks and competing for scarce resources that 
are allocated by a ‘central executive system’ (CES) located in the lateral prefrontal cortex 
(see Alonso et al (2014) and references therein).  This suggests that, while modifying an 
existing schema to create a new one, each unit in a schema is exclusively worked on by a 
distinct system of neurons. Each system makes demands for resources with task 
performance dependent on resource allocation. For relatively simple schemas (such as for a 
cow or a car), the resource constraint is not binding and all units in an existing schema are 
fully adjusted to create accurate units in the new schema. However, for sufficiently complex 
schemas such as a firm schema, the resource constraint is likely to be binding. In the context 
of CAPM, keeping things simple, expected cash flows and risk of the cash flows are the two 
key units in the schema of a given firm. So, each unit is worked on by a different system of 
neurons while modifying an existing schema to create a new one. With a binding resource 
constraint, how the scarce brain resources are split across the two units matters.  
In this article, we consider two ways in which scarce brain resources can be allocated 
towards the two units while creating a new schema for a firm: 
1) More resources are allocated to the brain system working on expected cash flows. 
2) More resources are allocated to the brain system working on risk of the cash flows. 
It follows that there are two types of traders. Traders, who are more adept at 
processing cash flow information as they have schemas with more resources devoted to 
cash flows, and traders who are better at processing risk-related information as they have 
schemas with more resources devoted to risk of the cash flows. Note that neither type of 
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trader completely ignores information, it is just that their relative skill in processing a certain 
type of information differs depending on the structure of schemas that they have.   
We show that which trader type is marginal matters for CAPM. When a cashflow-
schema trader is marginal, a version of CAPM is obtained (cashflow-schema CAPM), which 
displays a flatter relationship between stock beta and expected excess returns. Betting-
against-beta anomaly is observed along with the value and size effects. Hence, a unified 
explanation for betting-against-beta, value, and size anomalies emerges in this version. 
When a risk-schema trader is marginal, another version of CAPM arises (risk-schema 
CAPM). In this version, there is a strong positive relationship between beta and expected 
excess return with an implied risk-free rate that could be negative. Stocks that do better in 
the first version (low beta, small) do worse in the second version.  
Generally, the marginal investor is expected to be a cashflow-schema trader due to 
the importance given to earnings or cashflow news (Basu et al 2013). However, there are 
specific times when the marginal investor is expected to be a risk-schema trader: (i) when 
risks fall, or (ii) when cashflows fall. When risks fall, both cashflow-schema traders and risk-
schema traders increase their demand; however, the increase in demand from risk-schema 
traders is larger making them net buyers. When cashflows levels fall, both cashflow-schema 
traders and risk-schema traders reduce their demand; however, the demand reduction from 
risk-schema traders is smaller, making them net buyers.  
As risk reductions as well as cashflow reductions make risk-schema traders marginal, 
we predict a steeper relationship between beta and average stock returns at such times. 
Risk reductions can happen, at least for some traders, when macro announcements about 
interest rates, unemployment, and inflation are made. Cashflow level reductions are 
associated with weak aggregate spending in the economy generally indicated by low 
inflation. Hence, we predict a steeper relationship between beta and average stock returns 
on macro announcement days, and during periods when inflation is low. Indeed, this is what 
Savor and Wilson (2014) and Cohen et al (2005) find. 
In general, whenever trades are triggered by risk-reduction, we expect a strongly 
positive relationship between beta and average stock returns as the marginal trader is a 
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risk-schema trader at such times. For example, at market open, there is quite a bit of 
uncertainty about the opening price, which can be substantially different from the previous 
close. This uncertainty keeps most traders on the sidelines. Only traders who manage to 
reduce this uncertainty for themselves (perhaps by considering what happened in other 
markets across the globe while this particular market was closed) increase their demand. As 
risk reduction increases the demand by risk-schema traders more, they become net-buyers 
at open. Hence, we predict that, at market open, the relationship between beta and average 
excess stock return is strongly positive. Again, this is consistent with the empirical findings in 
Hendershott et al (2019). 
 
2. CAPM adjusted for Resource Allocation in the Brain 
We take a modern derivation of CAPM (such as in Frazzini and Pedersen (2014)) and add a 
twist to it, which is incorporating the implications of information processing through a 
schema as created by a resource-constrained brain.  
As in Frazzini and Pedersen (2014), we consider an overlapping generations (OLG) 
economy with agents having identical beliefs. Each agent lives for two periods. Agents that 
are born at 𝑡 aim to maximize their utility of wealth at 𝑡 + 1. Their utility functions are 
identical and exhibit mean-variance preferences. They trade securities 𝑠 = 1, ⋯ , 𝑆 where 
security 𝑠 pays dividends 𝑑𝑡𝑠and has 𝑛𝑠∗ shares outstanding, and invest the rest of their 
wealth in a risk-free asset that offers a rate of 𝑟𝐹. 
The market is described by a representative agent who maximizes: max 𝑛′{𝐸𝑡(𝑃𝑡+1 + 𝑑𝑡+1) − (1 + 𝑟𝐹)𝑃𝑡} − 𝛾2 𝑛′Ω𝑡𝑛  
where 𝑃𝑡 is the vector of prices, Ω𝑡 is the variance-covariance matrix of 𝑃𝑡+1 + 𝑑𝑡+1, and 𝛾 is 
the risk-aversion parameter. 
It follows that the price of a security, 𝑠, is given by: 
𝑃𝑡𝑠 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) − 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )1 + 𝑟𝐹                                                                                               (2.1) 
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where security 𝑠 payoff is 𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 = 𝑃𝑡+1𝑠 + 𝑑𝑡+1𝑠   
and aggregate market payoff is: 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 = 𝑛1∗(𝑃𝑡+11 + 𝑑𝑡+11 ) + 𝑛2∗(𝑃𝑡+12 + 𝑑𝑡+12 ) +∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙∙ +𝑛𝑆∗(𝑃𝑡+1𝑆 + 𝑑𝑡+1𝑆 ). 
 
2.1 Schema Creation 
As discussed in the introduction, schema is a mental template that contains units as well as 
a relationship between units. With mean-variance preferences, the relevant units are 
expected cash flows and the risk of cash flows, with the risk measured by covariance of cash 
flows with the aggregate market cash flows. We define a firm-schema as follows: “It is a set 
of preconceived ideas about expected cash flow levels and their risks that help in processing 
new information to evaluate one’s willingness-to-pay (WTP)”. So, a firm-schema has the 
following general form: 
𝑊𝑇𝑃 =  𝐴 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠 − (𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛)(𝐴 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘)1 + 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒  
To understand the process of schema creation, we consider how a typical stock 
analyst behaves while analysing a firm. Stock analysis is usually done at firm-level cash 
flows, which are then transformed to the level of an individual security. We denote firm-
level earnings or cash flows by 𝜋𝑡+1𝑠  where the number of outstanding shares is 𝑛𝑠∗. Earnings-
per-share (EPS) is then given by: 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1 = 𝜋𝑡+1𝑠𝑛𝑠∗ . Denoting the price-earnings (P/E) ratio, 
inclusive of dividends, for firm 𝑠 by 𝑐𝑠: 
𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 = 𝑃𝑡+1𝑠 + 𝑑𝑡+1𝑠 = 𝑐𝑠(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1) = 𝑐𝑠 𝜋𝑡+1𝑠𝑛𝑠∗  
We assume that when a trader analyses the cash flows of a firm 𝑠 for the first time, she 
creates a schema by modifying the schema for a similar firm 𝑞 that she has analysed earlier. 
The two units that constitute a schema for a firm are: expected cash flows and the risk of 
cash flows. So, the process of creating a new schema by modifying an existing schema 
requires modifications in these two units. 
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For expected cash flow levels, the modification is: 𝐸′(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 𝐸(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝑚1𝐷1 
where 𝐷1 = 𝐸(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 ) is the correct adjustment needed, and 0 ≤ 𝑚1 ≤ 1, 
captures the fraction of correct adjustment reached. If the brain is not resource constrained, 
then 𝑚1 = 1, which corresponds to full or correct adjustment. On the other hand, 𝑚1 < 1, 
indicates that the resource constraint is binding.  
Transforming to the level of EPS: 𝐸′(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 )𝑛𝑠∗ = 𝐸(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 )𝑛𝑞∗ 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝑚1𝐷1𝑛𝑠∗  
⇒ 𝐸′(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝑚1 (𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 )) 
⇒ 𝐸′(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 ) = (1 − 𝑚1) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 ) + 𝑚1𝐸(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 )                                                   
Similarly, the schema-unit for the risk of cash flows is obtained as follows: 𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) − 𝑚2𝐷2 
⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑠∗ = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞∗ 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝑚2 (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞∗ 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑠∗ ) ⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )= 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗− 𝑚2 (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )) ⇒𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = (1 − 𝑚2)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ + 𝑚2(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )) 
Following the behavior of a typical stock analyst, we define the notion of similar firms as 
having the following two properties: 
1) Firms that are in the same line of business, and 
8 
 
2) Have the same P/E ratios. 
P/E ratios (inclusive of dividends) for 𝑠 and 𝑞 are 𝑐𝑠 and 𝑐𝑞, and applying the above 
properties, the firms are in the same line of business with similar P/E ratios:  𝑐𝑐 ≈ 𝑐𝑞 = 𝑐 
So, the schema-unit for risk of the cash flows is estimated as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = (1 − 𝑚2)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ + 𝑚2(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))       ⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = (1 − 𝑚2)𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ + 𝑚2(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))       ⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣′(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )=  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )+ (1 − 𝑚2) (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))                               (2.2) 
Similarly, the schema-unit for expected cash flow levels can be written as: 
𝐸′(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 ) = (1 − 𝑚1) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑞 ) + 𝑚1𝐸(𝑐𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡+1𝑠 ) ⇒𝐸′(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) = (1 − 𝑚1) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) + 𝑚1𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) 
⇒ 𝐸′(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) =  𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝑚1) (𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ))                                      (2.3) 
(2.2) and (2.3) capture the following two properties associated with resource allocation in 
the brain (see Alonso et al (2014)): 
1) When a new schema is created by modifying an existing schema, the process is broken 
down into separate tasks, with each unit worked on by a separate system of neurons. Each 
system communicates its resource requirements to CES, which allocates finite brain 
resources between systems. 
2) The resource constraint is generally binding for complex schemas with task performance 
dependent on how much of resources are allocated to that particular task. 
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2.2 Cashflow-Schema CAPM 
Schema creation is a resource intensive process. A separate system of neurons is allocated 
to each unit in the schema of a firm, with allocation of brain resources to the two units 
determined by CES. In this section, we assume that more resources are devoted to the unit 
for expected cash flows when compared with the unit for risk of the cash flows. That is, 𝑚1 > 𝑚2. We refer to such traders as having a cashflow-schema, and the CAPM so obtained 
is referred to as the cashflow-schema CAPM. In section 2.4, we consider the other case 
where 𝑚2 > 𝑚1 (with such traders referred to as risk-schema traders). 
Without loss of generality, we set 𝑚1 = 1, it then follows that 𝑚2 = 𝑚 < 1. 
Suppose, there is a firm 𝑞 that had been analysed earlier, and its schema is modified to 
create a schema for firm 𝑠.  
The share price of firm 𝑞 is given by (from 2.1): 
𝑃𝑡𝑞 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )1 + 𝑟𝐹                                                                                               (2.4) 
And, the share price of firm 𝑠 is given by (using 2.2): 
𝑃𝑡𝑠 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) − 𝛾 {𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) + (1 − 𝑚) (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))} 1 + 𝑟𝐹  
                      (2.5) 
The expected returns of 𝑠 and 𝑞 are then (with 𝑅𝐹 = 1 + 𝑟𝐹): 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛾𝑃𝑡𝑞 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )                                                                                            (2.6) 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛾𝑃𝑡𝑠 {𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )+ (1 − 𝑚) (𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))}                               (2.7) 
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To fix ideas, initially it is useful to assume that there are just two firms in the market, 𝑠 and 𝑞 before generalizing to 𝑁 firms. Multiplying (2.6) by 𝑤𝑞 = 𝑛𝑞∗ 𝑃𝑡𝑞𝑃𝑡𝑀 , which is the weight of firm 𝑞 in the market portfolio (𝑃𝑡𝑀is the price of aggregate market portfolio), multiplying (2.7) by 𝑤𝑠 = 𝑛𝑠∗𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑡𝑀 , and adding: 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛾𝑃𝑡𝑀 {𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝑀) + (1 − 𝑚)(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑠∗)} 
⇒ 𝛾 = (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹)𝑃𝑡𝑀{𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑋𝑀) + (1 − 𝑚)(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑠∗)}                    (2.8) 
 
Substituting (2.8) in (2.6) and re-arranging/simplifying leads to the modified CAPM equation 
for 𝑞: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) ∙ 𝛽𝑞 ∙ ( 11 + (1 − 𝑚)(𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 − 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠))                             (2.9) 
where 𝛽𝑞 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ,𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 )  and 𝛽𝑠 = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ,𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 )  
Substituting (2.8) in (2.7) leads to: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) ∙ 𝛽𝑠 ∙ ( 1 + (1 − 𝑚) (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠 − 1)1 + (1 − 𝑚)(𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 − 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠))                         (2.10) 
(2.9) and (2.10) are modified CAPM expressions when schemas are created with a binding 
resource constraint (and with more brain resources allocated to the schema-unit concerned 
with expected cash flows). Note that (2.9) and (2.10) revert to the classical CAPM expression 
when 𝑚 = 1 (resource constraint in the brain is not binding).  
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Generalizing to 𝑁 firms with several 𝑞 firms spawning new schemas of several 𝑠 firms, the 
corresponding CAPM expressions for 𝑞 and 𝑠 firms are: 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) ∙ 𝛽𝑞∙ ( 11 + (1 − 𝑚)(∑ ∑ (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 − 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠)𝑠𝑞 ))                                                    (2.11)    𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) ∙ 𝛽𝑠
∙ ( 1 + (1 − 𝑚) (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠 − 1)1 + (1 − 𝑚)(∑ ∑ (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 − 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠)𝑠𝑞 ))                                                  (2.12)    
It is intriguing to note that CAPM expressions with finite brain resources have the same form 
as the classical CAPM with only one difference: a factor that multiplies 𝛽 appears. When the 
resource constraint is not binding, 𝑚 = 1, the multiplicative factor equals 1, so we revert 
back to the classical CAPM expression.  
2.3 High-alpha-of-low-beta, value, and size effects 
(2.12) and (2.11) show that the classical CAPM is a special case of a schema-adjusted CAPM. 
In schema-adjusted CAPM, there is an additional multiplicative factor, which multiplies 𝛽. 
This factor reduces to 1 when the resource constraint is not binding. In other words, the 
schema-adjusted CAPM reduces to the classical CAPM when 𝑚 = 1.  
 For a firm 𝑠 whose schema is created by modifying the schema of a similar firm 
(same line of business with similar P/E ratios) 𝑞, this additional multiplicative factor is equal 
to: 𝑓 = ( 1+(1−𝑚)(𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠 −1)1+(1−𝑚)(∑ ∑ (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞−𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠)𝑠𝑞 ))                                                                                           (2.13) 
Firms to which investors and analysts devote most of their time are likely to be ones that 
spawn new schemas for other firms.  Investor and analyst attention is strongly asymmetric 
with large, prominent firms (high market capitalizations) getting a lion’s share (Fang and 
Peress 2009). This motivates the following assumption: 
• Within a group of firms whose schemas are spawned by the same firm, 𝑞, the 
following holds: 𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 > 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠  
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It follows that 𝑓 > 0. Proposition 1 shows the emergence of high-alpha-of-low-beta in the 
cashflow-schema CAPM 
 
Proposition 1 (High-alpha-of-low-beta) In a given cross-section of stocks, a stock with low 
beta outperforms a stock with large beta on a risk-adjusted basis, all else equal. 
Proof 
Suppose there are two stocks 𝑠 and 𝑠′ such that 𝛽𝑠 < 𝛽𝑠′ . Risk-adjusted return on 𝑠 is given 
by: 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠 = {1 + (1 − 𝑚) (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠 − 1)} × 1𝑔 × (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) 
where 𝑔 is a constant in a given cross-section of stocks. 
 𝑔 = 1 + (1 − 𝑚)(∑ ∑ (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞 − 𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠)𝑠𝑞 ) 
Risk-adjusted return on 𝑠′ is given by: 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠′ ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠′ = {1 + (1 − 𝑚) (𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠′ − 1)} × 1𝑔 × (𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹) 
As 𝛽𝑠 and 𝛽𝑠′  appear in the denominator on R.H.S, it follows that: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ]−𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠 > 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠′ ]−𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠′  ∎ 
 
One can also see the size effect in the cashflow-schema CAPM as proposition 2 shows. 
 
Proposition 2 (Size effect) In a given cross-section of stocks, a stock with a lower weight in 
the market portfolio outperforms a stock with a higher weight on a risk-adjusted basis, all 
else equal 
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Proof 
Suppose there are two stocks 𝑠 and 𝑠′ such that 𝑤𝑠 < 𝑤𝑠′ . Following the same steps as in 
the proof of proposition 1, it is easy to see that  
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ]−𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠 > 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠′ ]−𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠′ . ∎ 
 
The cashflow-schema CAPM not only explains the high-alpha-of-low-beta and size-effect, 
but also the value effect. Value effect refers to the finding that a stock with low price to 
fundamentals tends to outperform a stock with high price to fundamentals.  Suppose there 
are two stocks 𝑠 and 𝑠′ that have the same fundamentals (expected cash flows and the risk 
of the cash flows). That is, 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ ), and 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ). 
Assume that 𝑃𝑠 < 𝑃𝑠′ .  
If there is a value effect, then it must be so that  𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠 > 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠′ ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠′  
To see if the above is true, start from: 
𝑃𝑠 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 )−𝛾{𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )+(1−𝑚)(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ −𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))} 1+𝑟𝐹 < 𝑃𝑠′ =𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ )−𝛾{𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )+(1−𝑚)(𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝑛𝑞′∗𝑛𝑠′∗ −𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ ,𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ))} 1+𝑟𝐹 . Assuming the same 
fundamentals across the two stocks, 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ ), and  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) =𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ), it follows that: 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ > 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑋𝑡+1𝑞′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞′∗𝑛𝑠′∗  ⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) > 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑋𝑡+1𝑞′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞′∗𝑛𝑠′∗ − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 
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⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) {𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ − 1}>  𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) {𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑋𝑡+1𝑞′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞′∗𝑛𝑠′∗ − 1} 
⇒ 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ > 𝐶𝑜𝑣 (𝑋𝑡+1𝑞′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠′ , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) 𝑛𝑞′∗𝑛𝑠′∗  
⇒ 𝑤𝑞𝛽𝑞𝑤𝑠𝛽𝑠 > 𝑤𝑞′𝛽𝑞′𝑤𝑠′𝛽𝑠′                                                                                                                            (2.14) 
It follows immediately from (2.14) that: 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠 > 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠′ ] − 𝑅𝐹𝛽𝑠′  
Proposition 3 follows. 
 
Proposition 3 (Value effect) In a given cross-section of stocks, a stock with low price to 
fundamentals outperforms a stock with high price to fundamentals on a risk-adjusted 
basis. 
 
It is intriguing that value and size effects as well as high-alpha-of-low-beta can all be seen in 
the cashflow-schema CAPM that has the same form as the classical CAPM except for the 
appearance of a factor, 𝑓, which multiplies beta. This multiplicative factor is larger for small 
size stocks, for low beta stocks, and for value stocks.  
 Stocks with original schemas that spawn schemas for other stocks have a generalized 
CAPM expression given in (2.11). That is, for such stocks, beta is multiplied by a factor less 
than 1, and a comparison of (2.11) and (2.12) clearly shows that such stocks have lower risk-
adjusted returns when compared with stocks with derived schemas. Original schemas are 
likely to be associated with stocks that command greater investor and analyst attention.   
Proposition 4 follows. 
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Proposition 4 (Attention effect) Large, prominent stocks that receive a lion’s share of 
investor attention have lower risk-adjusted return when compared with stocks that 
receive less investor attention. 
 
Proposition 4 is consistent with the empirical findings in Fang and Peress (2009). Next, we 
consider the case when more brain resources are allocated to risk of the cash flows when 
compared with expected cash flows. 
 
2.4 Risk-Schema CAPM 
When schema of a firm is being created by modifying an existing schema, the two schema-
units that need to be adjusted are expected cash flows and the risk of cash flows. In the 
previous sections, we considered the case when more brain resources are allocated to 
expected cash flows. In this section, we consider the other case: when more brain resources 
are allocated to the system of neurons working on the risk of cash flows. In (2.2) and (2.3), 
this means the following: 𝑚1 < 𝑚2. Without loss of generality, we set 𝑚2 = 1, it follows 
that 𝑚1 = 𝑚 < 1. 
The stock of firm 𝑠, whose schema is obtained by modifying the schema of a similar 
firm (same line of business and P/E ratios) 𝑞, is priced as: 
𝑃𝑡𝑠 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) + (1 − 𝑚) (𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 )) − 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )1 + 𝑟𝐹                         (2.15) 
The stock of firm 𝑞, whose schema is modified to obtain the schema for 𝑠, is priced as: 
𝑃𝑡𝑞 = 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 )1 + 𝑟𝐹                                                                                             (2.16) 
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Following the same set of steps as in section 2.2, the following generalized CAPM 
expressions for 𝑠 and 𝑞 stocks are obtained: 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛽𝑠 [𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹 + (1 − 𝑚)𝑃𝑡𝑀 ∑ ∑ (𝑛𝑞∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝑛𝑠∗𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ))𝑠𝑞 ]− (1 − 𝑚)𝑃𝑡𝑠 {𝑛𝑞∗𝑛𝑠∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 )}                                                               (2.17) 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛽𝑞 [𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹 + (1 − 𝑚)𝑃𝑡𝑀 ∑ ∑ (𝑛𝑞∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝑛𝑠∗𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ))𝑠𝑞 ]     (2.18) 
where 𝑃𝑡𝑀 is the value of aggregate market portfolio.  The above can be simplified further by 
defining expected market capitalization inclusive of dividends as: 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) = 𝑛𝑞∗ 𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑞 )𝑃𝑡𝑀  and 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 𝑛𝑠∗𝐸(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 )𝑃𝑡𝑀 : 
𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑠 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛽𝑠 [𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹 + (1 − 𝑚) ∑ ∑ (𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 ))𝑠𝑞 ]− (1 − 𝑚) {𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 )𝑤𝑡𝑠 }                                                                (2.19) 
where 𝑤𝑡𝑠 = 𝑛𝑠∗𝑃𝑡𝑠𝑃𝑡𝑀  is the weight of stock s in the market portfolio.  
 𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑞 ] = 𝑅𝐹 + 𝛽𝑞 [𝐸[𝑅𝑡+1𝑀 ] − 𝑅𝐹 + (1 − 𝑚) ∑ ∑ (𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 ))𝑠𝑞 ]              (2.20) 
Given evidence that large firms (large market capitalizations) get a lion’s share of 
investor and analyst attention (Fang and Peress 2009), it is likely that they are the ones 
spawning schemas of other firms.  Hence, we assume that 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) > 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 ).   
 It is immediately obvious that, in risk-schema CAPM, the relationship between beta 
and excess stock return is steeper than what classical CAPM predicts as beta is multiplied by 
a factor larger than excess market return. Larger the beta, bigger the improvement over 
classical CAPM prediction.  
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Furthermore, the implied risk-free rate is smaller than what the classical CAPM predicts and 
could even be negative: 
𝑅𝐹′ = 𝑅𝐹 − (1 − 𝑚) {𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑞 ) − 𝐸(𝑤𝑡+1𝑠 )𝑤𝑡𝑠 }                                                                           (2.21) 
It is straightforward to see that large size (market capitalization) stocks do better in this 
version as the implied risk-free rate is larger for them. 
Proposition 5 formalizes the key differences between the two versions of CAPM. 
Proposition 5 (Differences between the two versions) CAPM when more brain resources 
are allocated to expected cash flows (Cashflow Schema CAPM) differs from the CAPM 
when more brain resources are allocated to the risk of cash flows (Risk schema CAPM) in 
the following ways: 
1) The former has a flatter relationship between beta and expected returns, whereas 
the latter has a steeper relationship between beta and expected returns. 
2) The implied risk-free rate is smaller in the latter and could be negative. 
3) Small size, and low beta stocks do better in the former whereas large size, and high 
beta stocks do better in the latter. 
 
3. Discussion and Conclusions 
Depending on which trader type is marginal, either cashflow-schema-CAPM or risk-schema-
CAPM is observed. Using the behavior of a typical stock analyst as a guide, normally one 
expects to observe cashflow-schema-CAPM, as most of the resources of a typical stock 
analyst are devoted to estimating future cash flows. However, there are specific times when 
the marginal trader is expected to be a risk-schema trader. We expect this to happen when 
traders are prompted by risk-reductions or cashflow reductions. Using the superscript, 𝑖, for 
risk-schema traders, and the superscript, 𝑗, for cashflow-schema traders, we can map the 
change in their respective willingness-to-pay for 𝑠 as follows: 𝜕𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑠𝜕𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = −𝛾1 + 𝑟𝐹 < 0                                                                                                (2.22) 
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𝜕𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗𝑠𝜕𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑗(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 , 𝑋𝑡+1𝑀 ) = −𝛾𝑚1 + 𝑟𝐹 < 0                                                                                              (2.23) 𝜕𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑠𝜕𝐸𝑖(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 𝑚1 + 𝑟𝐹 > 0                                                                                                              (2.24) 𝜕𝑊𝑇𝑃𝑗𝑠𝜕𝐸𝑗(𝑋𝑡+1𝑠 ) = 11 + 𝑟𝐹 > 0                                                                                                              (2.25) 
 
As risk-reductions increase the willingness-to-pay of risk-schema traders by more, whereas, 
reductions in expected cashflows reduces their willingness-to-pay by less, it follows that the 
marginal trader is expected to be a risk-schema trader under these scenarios. Hence, as 
discussed in the introduction, when trades are prompted by risk-reductions (actual or 
perceived), as on macro announcement days or at market open, we expect a stronger 
relationship between beta and average stock returns. This is consistent with empirical 
findings (Savor and Wilson 2014, Hendershott et al 2019).  
 When trades are prompted by reductions in expected cashflow levels, such as when 
there is a negative shock to aggregate spending (generally associated with low inflation), we 
expect a stronger relationship between beta and average returns due to the marginal 
investor being a risk-schema trader. The findings in Cohen et al (2005) are consistent with 
this prediction. 
Research in brain sciences has made it clear that reliance on schemas is essentials for 
a normal functioning human being (see Spalding et al (2015) and references therein). 
Without schemas to attenuate information, and focus on the relevant bits, even simple 
tasks such as putting fuel in a car or setting a dinner table becomes overly exhausting as 
commonly experienced by individuals with autism (APA 2013). If reliance on schemas is 
responsible for deviations from classical CAPM, then a laboratory experiment with subjects 
who do not rely on schemas (such as people with high functioning autism) on a delayed 
time-scale (to avoid information overload) is our best bet at observing the classical CAPM in 
its full glory.  
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